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Elite Consensus and Political Polarization:  
Cases from Central Europe 
Thomas A. Baylis  
Abstract: »Elitenkonsens und Politische Polarisierung: Fälle aus Mitteleuro-
pa«. The concept of “elite consensus” is pivotal to the work of John Higley and 
his associates, but like many key political concepts its meaning is not precise. 
Consensus implies broad agreement, but just how much agreement, over what 
matters, among whom (i.e., who are the relevant elites), and how enduring re-
main to be specified. Higley et al. recognize these problems, placing their em-
phasis on procedural rather than substantive agreement and granting that indi-
vidual cases may lie somewhere on the borderline between elite consensus and 
disunity. In this essay I explore the consensus issue by examining several cases 
from East Central Europe and that of Germany in the aftermath of the fall of 
Communism. Higley and Burton see especially in the Polish and Hungarian 
“roundtables” instances of near-contemporary “elite settlements.” But in both 
cases observers have recently pointed to a degree of political polarization 
whose intensity seems to call into question the actual achievement of elite con-
sensus and indeed of “democratic consolidation.” I assess these apparently 
conflicting perspectives by examining the divergent views of the new political 
institutions and of the legitimacy of one another held by rival elites in Poland 
and Hungary and compare the cases of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Germany. 
Keywords: elite, elite consensus, legitimacy, roundtables, Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
Introduction 
Elite consensus, John Higley and his collaborators have argued in numerous 
books and articles, is (along with “elite structural integration”) the necessary 
condition for the development of stable liberal democracy. Writing after the 
momentous political changes in Central and East Central Europe of 1989 and 
1990, Higley and Michael Burton pointed to the cases of Poland and Hungary 
as examples of successful elite “settlements” – negotiated primarily in govern-
ment-opposition “roundtables” – that they view as one of the three historical 
avenues to consensus (2006, 84-8; see also Higley and Lengyel 2000, 14-5). 
Yet by the middle of the first decade of the new century, numerous observers 
claimed that both countries (and others) had been afflicted to an alarming de-
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gree by the “polarization” of their politics (and, at least by implication, of their 
elites). It is the apparent tension between the concept of consensus and claims 
of polarization in these and related cases I propose to examine in this essay. 
The related cases, in which assertions of growing polarization have been to be 
sure less prominent, are those of Germany – which Higley and Burton treat as a 
paradigmatic case of elite “convergence” in the years after World War II, first 
in the West but presumably extended to the East after 1989 (2006, 150-4) – and 
of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, whose breakup in 1992 is said to have 
removed the most serious obstacle to convergence among elites in each (2006, 
169-71). Elite convergence, in which some rival factions gradually recognize 
that their electoral interests are better served by cooperation and coalition-
building than by uncompromising opposition, is for the two authors the second 
primary route to consensus. The third historical route, observed in certain cases 
of emergence from colonial rule, they see as no longer relevant for contempo-
rary societies. 
As with many all but indispensable terms of political analysis, the meaning 
of both “consensus” and “polarization” is anything but precise. Comparing 
consensus to the loosely related concept of “consent,” P. H. Partridge (1971, 
73) writes that the former is “even more controversial and problematic … 
There are the same types of difficulties in defining, identifying or locating it, 
and, as with consent, great difficulties in specifying and producing the evidence 
that demonstrates its existence.” V. O. Key (1961, 27) earlier characterized the 
concept as “nebulous,” and a “crutch,” and noted the rarity of inquiries into the 
“distribution among the population of whatever attitudes, beliefs, or behaviours 
constitute consensus.” The same observation could easily be applied to re-
search on elites. 
Just how much agreement, one might ask, does consensus require? Pre-
sumably the level lies somewhere between that of a bare elite majority and 
unanimity, but where? Over what matters, precisely? How enduring must the 
agreement in question be? (Temporary tactical accords are, one assumes, not 
sufficient.) Among which elite groups, and how and at what point in time are 
they so designated? Are there any reliable empirical indicators – elite opinion 
surveys, levels of political violence, numbers of successive, peacefully con-
tested elections – for measuring consensus levels? 
Higley and his co-authors address a number of these issues. First, unlike 
many who have written on the subject, they are concerned only with consensus 
among elites, which may or may not be accompanied or (in their view more 
likely) followed by popular consensus.1 The relevant elites are identified on the 
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basis of their institutional positions. They are required only to share a proce-
dural consensus, agreement on the “rules of the game,” not on substantive 
policy goals or fundamental values. That consensus will be “mostly tacit” (Hig-
ley and Burton, 9); indeed, Higley and Burton observe that appearances are 
often deceptive – elites may either exaggerate or minimize their agreement on 
“basics,” depending on the political circumstances. Higley et al. stress that their 
”consensually unified elites” and “disunified elites” are Weberian ideal types, 
and that in practice there may be “imperfectly unified” elites in an “intermedi-
ate position” (Field and Higley 1980, 40). Once achieved, however, full elite 
consensus is almost always enduring (Higley, Burton 2006 and Field 1990, 
425), although Higley and Burton now see contemporary Venezuela as an 
exception (2006, 78) and are troubled by signs of growing elite dissensus in the 
United States. Curiously, they do not see the American Civil War as evidence 
of a consensus breakdown (2006, 113-4).2 
Not all the conceptual issues, of course, can be fully resolved. The extent to 
which procedural or institutional consensus can long be sustained in the ab-
sence of agreement on substantive matters remains questionable; elites experi-
encing repeated defeats on what they see as vital policy matters or core values 
are unlikely to continue to acquiesce easily in the mechanisms that legitimated 
those defeats. Particularly in situations of rapid institutional transformation, 
such as those that occurred in East Central Europe in 1989-1990, identifying 
the appropriate elite positions and their occupants may be difficult and subject 
to rapid change. If one of the elite negotiating partners is in retreat and the 
erosion of its authority continues or accelerates, any concessions it makes may 
soon come to be seen as inadequate. Moreover, not all potentially relevant 
elites may have participated in the presumed “settlement;” those that have not 
may not feel bound by it. Within the settlement, short-term tactical concessions 
may be mistaken for more fundamental levels of agreement. 
“Polarization,” of course, poses analogous difficulties. How far apart, and 
on what matters, must the “poles” be – and are there just two poles, as the 
metaphor implies, or can there be multiple ones? To what extent is rhetorical 
excess – not uncommon in democratic polities – likely to be mistaken for un-
compromising hostility? Again, what empirical indicators can provide reliable 
measures of the degree and intensity of polarization? 
I cannot pretend to resolve all of these difficulties. But a useful approach to 
addressing them in a specific context may be to examine the attitudes of a 
range of elite actors toward fundamental political, social, and economic institu-
tions and toward one another. To what extent do rival elites accept the institu-
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tions as legitimate, or at least refrain from overtly challenging them? To what 
extent do such elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the politi-
cal process? In a situation in which the institutions have been newly created, 
and elite positions and their occupants have recently emerged – such as East 
Central Europe since 1989 – the answers to those questions may be especially 
consequential. 
Poland 
The “Roundtable” talks held between February and April 1989 between repre-
sentatives of the Communist government of Poland and the political opposition 
represented by Solidarity (and a less important “third side” of official unions 
and other organizations linked to the ruling party) were the first of several such 
negotiations that marked the crisis of East Central Europe’s Communist re-
gimes and laid the institutional foundations for the new democratic, market-
based systems that replaced them (Osiatynski 1996). The participants in the 
talks, at the time, would undoubtedly have been surprised to learn that they 
were engaged in shaping an enduring “elite settlement.” Communist negotia-
tors were seeking to win broader support for necessary economic reforms with-
out giving up essential political control, while Solidarity’s representatives were 
concerned primarily to establish the union’s own legality and to lay the 
groundwork for further-reaching democratization at a later stage. Both were 
surprised when the subsequent semi-free parliamentary elections and defections 
among the Communists’ presumed allies led to the formation of a Solidarity-
led government. 
Largely absent from the talks were hard-line Communists, who quickly be-
came irrelevant in the new political order, and many more radical Solidarity 
(and church) leaders who were to play an increasingly important part in that 
order. Those leaders subsequently denied the legitimacy of much of the settle-
ment, even speaking of “betrayal.” They viewed the agreement as an “elitist” 
(!) cabal, rejecting in particular the secularist bent of the new government, its 
liberal economic reforms, and its “thick line” approach to dealing with the 
Communist past. Their indignation grew when former Communists recaptured 
control of the parliament (in 1993) and then the presidency (1995). The several 
political parties that shared Solidarity roots split between those led by moderate 
reformers and ones dominated by their more radical critics, to the growing 
advantage of the latter (and, for a time, of the post-Communist SLD). Freedom 
Union, the party associated with most of Solidarity’s best-known intellectual 
reformers, itself suffered leadership fissures and faded into oblivion after 2001 
(Bader and Zapart 2011, 262-3). 
Somewhat inadvertently, the Roundtable and the events that followed it did 
establish the institutional framework for Poland’s “Third Republic.” Lech 
Wałeşa, while symbolically associated with the Roundtable (he did not, how-
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ever, actively participate in it), arguably weakened the new institutional order 
through his attacks on the first Solidarity government under Tadeusz Ma-
zowiecki and through his ill-considered attempts to push beyond the admittedly 
ambiguous limits of his authority as president. A new constitution, which was 
written while both the parliament and Presidency were led by the SLD, won the 
support of the Freedom Union; it appeared essentially to consolidate the post-
1989 order. The document, however, was only narrowly approved in a 1997 
referendum, thanks to right-wing and church opposition. Then in 2005 a right-
wing post-Solidarity party, PiS (Truth and Justice), won both the parliamentary 
and presidential elections after promising to create a new “Fourth Republic” 
and write a new constitution; at one point it also called for the delegalization of 
the post-Communist SLD, which had led the government between 1993 and 
1997 and again from 2001 until 2005 (Brier 2009; Lang 2007). 
At first glance, one would not think that the call by a victorious elite faction 
to outlaw the former governing party and scuttle a constitution approved only 
eight years earlier would be compatible with elite consensus, however defined. 
To be sure, lacking the requisite supermajority, the PiS was unable to carry out 
its agenda and the SLD had in any case been reduced to a shadow of its former 
self, partly through its own doing, following its immersion in a mire of alleged 
corruption and its own internal turmoil. The PiS-led governing coalition, de-
pendent upon still more extreme rightist allies, the nationalist Self-Defence and 
the conservative Catholic League of Polish Families, came apart in 2007 and 
was defeated in new elections by its one-time anti-SLD ally, the more centrist, 
secular, and economically liberal Civic Platform (PO), also a Solidarity heir. 
Since then Polish politics has been dominated by the bitter rivalry of the two 
parties, personified by their leaders Jaroslaw and the late President Lech Kac-
zyński (PiS) and Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO). 
An institutional symbol of polarization in Poland has been the Institute for 
National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes Against 
the Polish Nation, first established in 1998 but with its “lustration” powers 
greatly expanded in 2007 while PiS still governed. The requirement that all 
those with a “public function,” including academics, teachers, and journalists, 
complete a form stating whether or not they had collaborated with the secret 
police came under sharp attack and was ultimately invalidated by the Constitu-
tional Court (Killingsworth 2010, 278-9). Publications of the Institute, claiming 
among other things that even Wałęsa had been a collaborator, also provoked 
angry responses (and a lawsuit by Wałęsa against President Kaczyński, who 
had repeated the charge). While most obviously meant to discredit the post-
Communist SLD and its leaders, the Institute’s pursuit of lustration also chal-
lenged the legitimacy of other elite figures, as the case of Wałęsa suggests. 
The tragic plane crash in Smolensk in April 2010 that took the lives of 
President Kaczyński and other members of the Polish elite only briefly moder-
ated the divisive tone of the country’s politics (Bugajski 2011). Even the burial 
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of the President in the Wawel cathedral in Cracow, resting place of Polish 
kings and other heroes, provoked sharp criticism, and PiS leaders were vitriolic 
in criticizing the findings of the Russian investigation of the crash; they were 
particularly indignant at the suggestion that the President’s own impatience 
might have contributed to the disaster. Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the President’s 
brother and PiS head, who ran unsuccessfully to succeed him as head of state, 
soon reverted to highly polarizing rhetoric. In the view of a Polish journalist, 
the disaster produced in its wake “a regular civil war” over its moral interpreta-
tion, with Kaczyǹski accusing the Prime Minister of “treason” and co-
responsibility for the accident (Buras 2011). 
Hungary3 
Conflict over the character of Hungary’s new democratic system dates from its 
founding in 1989, and is rooted in still longer cultural patterns and historical 
experience. Although Communist reformers had initiated many of the political 
and economic changes ratified in the country’s roundtable talks, and the non-
Communist opposition was notably weaker and more divided than its Polish 
counterpart, those talks were more confrontational than the Polish ones (Bozóki 
2002). The first non-Communist government, led by the conservative Hungar-
ian Democratic Forum and its leader József Antall, struggled against the con-
sensus-oriented restraints imposed by the drastically revised constitution, seek-
ing in particular to overcome what it saw as the hostility of the media and the 
resistance of the President and the Constitutional Court to its agenda. As Attila 
Ágh has argued (Ágh 2001), when conservatives recaptured control of the 
government in 1998, this time led by the (once liberal) Fidesz (“Young Democ-
rats”) and its supposedly “charismatic” leader Viktor Orbán, they sought again 
to centralize and “presidentialize” their rule, substituting a “majoritarian” (and 
arguably authoritarian) vision of democracy for the “consensual” one favoured 
by the Socialists – the successors to the former Communists. Employing the 
rhetoric of a “second revolution,” Fidesz then and after leaving office in 2002 
developed what one Hungarian analyst describes as a “second political culture, 
an alternative polity that established itself as a Hungarian version of the New 
Right” (Bozóki 2008). 
Hungary’s parliamentary elections of 2002 and 2006 were closely contested 
and, in the words of one commentary, characterized by “aggressiveness, friend-
enemy thinking, and conspiracy theories going as far as accusations of spying” 
(Barlai and Hartlieb 2010, 88). Following their somewhat unexpected 2002 
defeat, Orbán and Fidesz resorted to an “extra-parliamentary” strategy, creating 
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citizens groups with the name “Forward, Hungary” (inspired, it appears, by 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia) and emphasizing heavily the values of what 
they viewed as the “Hungarian nation.” Still deeper polarization has character-
ized the years since 2006. A critical turning point was the ferocious and in part 
violent reaction to the admission by Ferenc Gyurcsány, then the Socialist prime 
minister – in what he thought was a private party caucus meeting – that his 
party had “lied morning, noon and night” about the health of the Hungarian 
economy in order to win that year’s parliamentary elections (see Palonen 
2009). Presumably Gyurcsány’s candour was meant to prepare the way for the 
introduction of painful austerity measures. But the publication of his remarks 
produced days of rioting, hundreds of injuries, and the storming of the state 
television station (Perczel 2006). Another round of rioting came a month later, 
set off by competing efforts to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1956 anti-
Communist uprising. That anniversary was commemorated in separate cere-
monies; Fidesz and the right refused to participate in the official event organ-
ized by the Socialist, i.e. post-Communist, government, on the grounds that 
those whose predecessors suppressed the uprising should not lead its celebra-
tion. The rival events culminated in right-wing violence, accusations of police 
brutality, and subsequent bitter recriminations (Csipke 2011, 117-24). 
After eight years of Socialist-led governments, Orbán and Fidesz returned to 
power in 2010, this time with a two-thirds majority in parliament (a margin 
otherwise unheard of in the region’s new democracies). The backdrop for its 
massive victory was not only the continuing popular reaction against perceived 
Socialist duplicity, but the severity of the country’s actual economic woes, 
suffered in the context of the world financial crisis. Hungary’s difficulties 
required a European Union and IMF “bailout” and harsh domestic austerity 
measures. These, along with repeated allegations of corruption, made it impos-
sible for the Socialists to recover, even after the replacement of Gyurcsány by 
the less controversial Gordon Bajnai. The implosion of the Socialists, who had 
led the country’s government for twelve of the twenty-one years since 1989, 
was underscored by the simultaneous rise of a party still more nationalist (and 
more alarming to its critics) than Fidesz: Jobbik, which finished a close third to 
the socialists (Spannenberger 2010). 
The size of Fidesz’s majority was made possible by Hungary’s complex 
mixed electoral system. It converted the 52 per cent of the popular vote won by 
the party and its Christian Democratic partner into the two-thirds parliamentary 
advantage that allowed them to implement their agenda – a program of radical 
constitutional and political changes – without even nominal consultation with 
the weakened opposition. The centrepiece of Fidesz’s post-election program 
was the preparation of a new constitution, which was rushed to approval within 
a year of the 2010 elections (it is scheduled to take effect at the beginning of 
2012). It is hardly a consensual document: both the Socialists and the vaguely 
liberal/”green” LDMP (“Politics Can Be Different”) refused to participate in its 
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formulation, convinced they could have no influence over its content, boy-
cotted the parliament’s vote on its approval (Jobbik members voted against it), 
and refused to recognize its legitimacy. For his part, Prime Minister Orbán 
praised the constitution as “the most important document for Hungary’s na-
tional revival,” and condemned the previous document – originally enacted in 
1949 but almost entirely rewritten in 1989 and 1990 – as a “constitution of 
fiascos” (MTI [Hungarian News Agency], April 23, 2011). Other supporters 
claimed that the new constitution represented the final overcoming of Commu-
nism (Müller 2011). The government declined to submit the new text to a ref-
erendum; its selection of a Fidesz loyalist, Pal Schmitt, as President also as-
sured there would be no resistance from that quarter. 
Symbolically, the new document incorporates and celebrates Fidesz’s con-
servative, nationalist, “Christian” ideology. Its extensive Preamble includes a 
“National Avowal of Faith” that invokes Hungary’s Christian character and the 
heritage of the (medieval) “Holy Crown.” The National Avowal of Faith is not 
just rhetorical: it is supposed to inform future interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. Other provisions enlarge and weaken the country’s Constitutional Court 
and in the view of some could threaten the jurisprudence of the previous 
twenty-one years. The Constitution is made extremely difficult to amend and 
Fidesz appointees difficult to remove even after a future election. Together 
with other legislation, pushed through in a breakneck legislative schedule, it 
grants citizenship and possibly voting rights to ethnic Hungarians abroad and 
gives Fidesz appointees extensive supervisory authority over the media. Such 
provisions and the manner of the constitution’s drafting and approval have not 
only provoked bitter domestic opposition but also criticism from neighbouring 
countries, notably Slovakia, whose own nationalists are fearful of the effects on 
that country’s Hungarian minority, as well as from the European Parliament, 
U.S. State Department officials, and other foreign commentators. 
The troubling tone of contemporary Hungarian politics is magnified by the 
rise of Jobbik and its close ties to the “Hungarian Guard” (outlawed in 2009 by 
a Budapest court but quickly reconstituted), which for many aroused memories 
of the fascist-era “Arrow Cross” movement. Both organizations are led by 
Gábor Vona, a 32-year-old former history and psychology student and teacher, 
although he shares the spotlight with Krisztina Morvai, a lawyer and university 
instructor and, ironically, one-time UN human rights employee. The party 
seems to have particularly strong appeal for the young, including the educated 
young; while also anti-Semitic the principal targets of its hostility are the 
Roma, whom it stereotypically blames for most Hungarian crime. Its “aggres-
sive nationalism” outstrips that of Fidesz, and includes the rejection of the post-
World War I Trianon treaty, which reduced Hungary to about one-third its 
earlier size and left millions of ethnic Hungarians outside its borders (Pelinka 
2010; Kahlweit 2010; Vona 2010). Jobbik is highly critical of Fidesz on the 
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national level, seeing it as little better than the Socialists, but the two are said to 
have cooperated on the local level (Barlai and Hartleb 2010, 92). 
When one considers the positions of what have been Hungary’s two princi-
pal parties, evidence of underlying elite consensus is hard to find. The one, 
currently dominant, party in effect denies the legitimacy of the other; indeed, it 
has taken steps toward initiating criminal prosecution of the three previous 
Socialist Prime Ministers and their Finance Ministers “for mismanagement of 
public funds” (Eddy 2011). For their part, the Socialists refuse to accept the 
constitution forced through by its rival, especially the symbolism incorporated 
in it as well as parts of the institutional framework. When one adds the strength 
of the extreme right – Jobbik having won 16.7 per cent of the votes in the 2010 
national elections – and its attacks on the elites of both of the other major 
camps, and considers the frequency with which politics (along with a uni-
formed rightist “guard”) has moved into the streets and engendered violence in 
recent years, it is difficult to be sanguine about the condition of Hungarian 
democracy. 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 
As Higley and Burton (2006) point out, the conflict between Czech and Slovak 
elites over the institutions of their common state, and particularly over the 
division of authority between the national and republic governments, was ef-
fectively resolved by the “velvet divorce” of the two countries at the end of 
1992. How much actual “elite convergence” has occurred in the two successor 
states is not as easy to assess, however. Differences among the major parties in 
the Czech Republic over the existing institutional framework or the substance 
of policy do not appear to go beyond those found in longer-established democ-
racies, and the most serious right-wing extremist party has faded into near-
oblivion. But since 1996 the country’s governments have suffered from insta-
bility and at times stalemate, and the legitimacy of its third or (after 2010) 
fourth largest party has been challenged by some of its opponents. 
That party is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), 
which has won between 11 and 18 per cent of the popular vote in parliamentary 
elections but has been excluded from governing coalitions, one of the reasons 
stable governments have proven difficult to form. The KSČM is the successor 
to Czechoslovakia’s former ruling Communist Party; it is regularly described 
as “unreconstructed,” in part because of its refusal to shed its Communist 
name, in contrast to its Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, and East German counter-
parts. It has managed to survive in a difficult political context, one in which 
“anticommunism as a basic legitimization topos” early “became a defining 
element of the emerging Czech political culture,” most notably in the debates 
over the country’s controversial Lustration Act (Kopeček 2011, 256-60). 
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The Czech Senate has called for the KSČM to be outlawed, and within the 
centre-right coalition government that took office in 2010 the new “TOP 09” 
party has promoted the same objective. Under the Czech (and Slovak) constitu-
tions parties that “threaten the basic democratic order” can in fact be banned 
(Novotny and Thieme 2010, 113), as they can under a similar provision in 
Germany’s Basic Law. A government report, however, has concluded that the 
courts would not be able to find sufficient grounds for doing so in the case of 
the KSČM (Richter 2011). 
In fact, the party has largely worked within the Czech Republic’s constitu-
tional framework, however outrageous occasional pronouncements of individ-
ual leaders (mostly having to do with the assessment of the party’s pre-1989 
record) may appear to its critics. It has also cooperated with previous Social 
Democratic governments and either “tolerates” or participates in several re-
gional governments led by that party. One suspects that the much-discussed 
possibility of a national Social Democratic government taking office that would 
be dependent on Communist support (Kopeček and Pšeja 2008), has something 
to do with proposals to outlaw the KSČM. In sum, as Higley and Burton (2006, 
170) admit, “it is hard to identify a clear convergence – or, for that matter – an 
elite settlement” in the changes that have taken place among Czech elites. 
Until 1998, there were few better examples of a polarized political system 
than that of Slovakia. As Higley and Burton (2006, 170) note, the country’s 
“elites were clearly disunited, and the regime was an illiberal democracy.” The 
autocratic and self-serving behaviour of Vladimír Mečiar, the country’s prime 
minister following its separation from the Czech Republic (except for a few 
months in 1994), and his bitter struggle against President Michal Kovác – 
including a bizarre attempt to kidnap the President’s son – mobilized the coun-
try’s more democratic and liberal forces against him. A broad anti-Mečiar 
coalition took power in 1998 and returned with a more pronounced centre-right 
orientation in 2002. Mečiar’s party (the HZDS) re-entered office in a support-
ing role in the government of Róbert Fico in 2006, an odd coalition of Fico’s 
leftist “Smer” – the successor to the Communist successor party the SDL’ – 
with the HZDS and the extreme nationalist SNS. Smer won by far the most 
votes in the 2010 parliamentary elections, but HZDS fell below the 5 per cent 
level required to win seats, and SNS barely scraped in with just 5.1 per cent of 
the vote. A new centre-right government replaced Fico’s. 
The composition of the Fico government produced some discomfort in the 
European Union, and led to Smer’s temporary suspension from the EU’s Party 
of European Socialists. But the government did not depart as sharply as might 
have been expected from the policies of its predecessor, and the continuing 
(relative) economic success of Slovakia, underscored by its entry into the Euro 
zone, seemed to ease political tensions. The loss by Mečiar’s party of its par-
liamentary status and the weakening of the SNS has left Slovakia less visibly 
divided than its neighbours. To be sure, the issue of the loyalties of Slovakia’s 
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ethnic Hungarian population – the principal target, along with the Roma, of 
SNS demagogy – has been revived owing to the Orbán government’s national-
ity law, sharply attacked by Fico (Schwarz 2010).4 But the external tensions 
with Hungary do not seem to have produced comparable domestic discord. It is 
also worth noting that the (indirect) Communist heritage of Smer does not 
appear to have produced the level of vitriol that has been directed at the succes-
sor parties in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Germany. 
Germany 
Higley and Burton (2006, 150-4) date the “convergence” of West German 
elites to the 1950s and 1960s, seeing the Social Democrats’ (SPD) Bad Godes-
berg conference of 1959 and still more the 1966-1969 Grand Coalition of the 
two largest parties as the events best symbolizing that convergence. They do 
not analyze the elite dimensions of the unification of the two German states in 
1990 (see, however, Hoffmann-Lange 1998, 149-56). However, the thorough 
discrediting of the former Communist elite, the “transfer” of numerous West 
Germans to elite positions in the East and the emergence of new East German 
leaders from the ranks of former dissidents, “satellite” party members, and 
many who were previously politically uninvolved permitted a relatively smooth 
transition on the elite level. The success of a new Grand Coalition (2005-2009) 
under an East German Chancellor could be taken as renewed evidence of elite 
consensus. To be sure, the new “all-German” elite was dominated by its West-
ern component (Yoder 1999; Yoder 2010; Bürklin, Rebensdorf et al. 1997). 
Elite surveys both before and after unification seemed to indicate broad accep-
tance of the Federal Republic’s “rules of the game;” surveys taken among the 
general public have been somewhat more ambiguous.5 
Extremist right-wing parties have fared less well in German elections than 
their counterparts not only in East Central Europe but also than ones in other 
west European states, including Austria and predominantly German-speaking 
Switzerland (Steglich 2010). Where Germany does have something in common 
with its eastern neighbours is in the conflicting assessments of its Communist 
                                                             
4  Ethnic Hungarian parties have been part of Slovakia’s centre-right coalitions but not of 
Fico’s.  
5  There is a sizeable literature that considers whether East Germans are less fully committed 
to “democratic” values than West Germans; it appears that they are somewhat more likely 
to associate democracy with social equality and less with individual rights. Eastern elites 
are said to differ less markedly from western ones in this respect. See, for example, Kaina 
(1997). 
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successor party, now Die Linke and formerly the Party of Democratic Social-
ism (PDS).6 
The PDS and Die Linke have operated with some success within the frame-
work of the Federal Republic’s political system. They have governed in coali-
tions with Social Democrats in the eastern states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
and Brandenburg and the city of Berlin; for several years the PDS also “toler-
ated” an SPD minority government in Sachsen-Anhalt. Overall they have com-
peted on roughly an equal level with the SPD and the Christian Democrats in 
the eastern Länder and eastern Berlin (in recent years lagging somewhat behind 
the CDU but ahead of the SPD); they have also established a modest foothold 
in a number of western states. Their possible participation in or support for 
governments has been pivotal in several recent state-level coalition negotia-
tions; speculation over their possible participation in a federal coalition has 
cantered on a fairly distant future, in contrast to otherwise similar discussions 
in the Czech Republic. 
Nevertheless, controversy about the very legitimacy of Die Linke as a par-
ticipant in the Federal Republic’s politics continues to be a persistent theme in 
the media and among politicians. Attacks from the centre-right parties 
(CDU/CSU and FDP) to be sure often appear to be instrumentalized weapons 
meant less to discredit Die Linke than to damage the SPD, which they accuse of 
dalliance with apologists for dictatorship. Less transparently partisan criticism 
has come from former dissidents – some of them within the SPD – and others 
who were victimized by the former regime and its notorious secret police, the 
Stasi. There is also a surprisingly large literature, some of it semi-scholarly in 
format, arguing that Die Linke does not satisfy democratic norms.7 In contrast 
to the assault on the KSČM in the Czech Republic, no credible attempt to out-
law Die Linke appears to be underway, in spite of occasional calls for such 
measures.8 But the party and many of its leaders do remain under surveillance 
by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz), an-
other indicator of their incomplete acceptance as legitimate political players. 
Die Linke’s critics find ammunition for their attacks especially in the party’s 
ambiguous programmatic commitment to “system change.” By such change 
                                                             
6  Die Linke is the product of a merger between the largely eastern PDS and disaffected, 
largely western, trade unionists and Social Democrats; it also includes veteran members of 
more radical western groups) (Hough et al. 2007). 
7  A particularly diligent critic has been the French writer Patrick Moreau, who has written or 
co-authored at least a half-dozen books on the subject, e.g. Moreau (2002).  
8  Thus in August 2011 the General Secretary of the Christian Social Union (the Bavarian 
partner of the CDU) called for an examination of a possible prohibition, in response to 
statements by some Linke members justifying the construction of the Berlin Wall (Spiegel-
Online August 8, 2011). Interestingly, Die Linke supports a ban on the extremist right-wing 
NDP, even though its fiercest critics have suggested using the constitutional provision that 
makes such a ban possible against itself.  
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Die Linke clearly does not mean any basic change in the Federal Republic’s 
political institutions or rules (which it has by and large benefitted from), but 
modification of its system of property relations. The party’s long-term objec-
tive is the replacement of “capitalism” by some form of “socialism;” the short-
term means to this end is hotly disputed – how much nationalization of basic 
enterprises, what form public ownership or control might take, and so on. To 
my knowledge the Basic Law does not treat the Federal Republic’s current 
economic order as inviolable; at the time it was written, after all, the Social 
Democrats themselves were committed to extensive nationalization. But de-
bates within Die Linke on these issues, occasional individual statements by 
(mostly lower-level) party leaders that appear to defend or rationalize certain 
GDR policies or practices, and the periodic revelations linking various party 
leaders to the Stasi provide fuel for the critics. Germany’s Commission for the 
Processing of the Stasi Archives (popularly the “Gauck” and later the “Birth-
ler” Commission) has helpfully provided apparently incriminating information 
to the media, although it is less controversial than the Polish Institute of Na-
tional Remembrance. 
Conclusions 
The level of disagreement among elites over the legitimacy of the political 
institutions introduced in 1989 and the ferocity of attacks on the right of oppos-
ing elites even to participate in public life at all offer a suggestive guide to the 
presence or absence of elite consensus in the new democracies of Central and 
East Central Europe. The approval in Hungary of a new constitution and other 
fundamental laws with the help of a two-thirds super-majority was premised on 
the repudiation of the constitutional order that had been in place for over 
twenty years and denial of the legitimacy of the Socialist-led governments that 
held power during much of that time. The Socialists, along with the smaller 
Politics Can Be Different party and many members of the country’s intellectual 
elite in turn reject the validity of the new document and charge the government 
with serious abuse of the democratic process. In Poland, the institutions of the 
“Third Republic” have largely survived the attempt of the Kaczyński twins’ 
PiS to replace it with a “Fourth Republic,” but the partisans of the latter have 
not given up the fight. Commentators on Hungarian politics all but invariably 
speak of its severe “polarization,” and the term also surfaces frequently in 
analyses of the Polish scene (see Wasilewski 2010). To be sure, the depth of 
elite hostility in Hungary, punctuated by the threat of the current governing 
party to prosecute the leaders of the former governing one, appears to go be-
yond that in Poland. 
The common thread that links the Hungarian and Polish cases and in smaller 
degree those of the Czech Republic and Germany is that of anti-Communism – 
more precisely, the continuing and still effective exploitation of anti-Com-
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munist themes as weapons of day-to-day politics. The now ostensibly Social 
Democratic successor parties of Hungary and Poland, the “democratic social-
ists” of Die Linke, and the less reformed KSČM of the Czech Republic are all 
identified by their elite critics with the crimes of the parties’ Communist-era 
predecessors, even though they have participated in conventional electoral 
politics for over two decades while commanding the support of significant 
portions of the population. More moderate parties, such as the SPD and Czech 
Social Democrats, that express some willingness to treat the successor parties 
as legitimate competitors and even possible coalition partners are attacked for 
doing so; in the cases of Poland and Hungary, the PiS and Fidesz (and Jobbik) 
condemn the entire political order that existed between 1989 and 2010 as still 
contaminated by the Communist past. Even Poland’s Civic Platform, itself a 
beneficiary of the reaction against the years of SLD rule, stands accused by the 
PiS of insufficient anti-Communist fervour. It seems to make little difference 
how comparatively moderate either the ruling parties actually were during the 
last years of the Communist era or the successor parties have been in the years 
since. The attacks on the reformist Hungarian Communists and their pragmatic 
Socialist successor as well as on the parallel Polish parties exceed in intensity 
those directed at the hard-line Czech and East German parties – possibly be-
cause of the greater electoral success of the former in the post-1989 period. 
Nevertheless, outrage over the fact that Die Linke and the KSČM continue to 
play a significant role in their countries’ politics is a persistent rhetorical theme 
for some critics – a quite genuine one especially for those who suffered under 
the old regime. For others it serves more instrumental purposes. 
Is the strength of extremist parties of the right in Hungary and to a lesser ex-
tent in Slovakia also a sign of elite dissensus? Conversely, is the relative weak-
ness of such parties in Germany and their decline in the Czech Republic and 
Poland a mark of growing elite consensus? Far right and other “populist” par-
ties of course view themselves as opponents of the established elites, but to the 
extent they endure, win substantial followings and parliamentary seats, and 
even occupy governmental posts, their status as no more than alienated outsid-
ers irrelevant to the question of a broader elite consensus may be subject to 
challenge. The rise of such parties is, of course, by no means confined to the 
former Communist world, nor is the phenomenon of polarization more gener-
ally, and demagogy directed against immigrants and ethnic minorities some-
times extends into “respectable” elite ranks.9 But restricting our view to the five 
countries we have examined, at least the success of Hungary’s Jobbik and its 
ability to reinforce at a still more virulent level themes exploited by Fidesz has 
troubling implications for the prospects for building elite or societal consensus. 
                                                             
9  The daunting sales in Germany of an anti-immigrant book by Thilo Sarrazin (2010), former 
SPD and Federal Bank official, come to mind.  
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As many observers have pointed out, elite divisions in Hungary and Poland 
have deep cultural and historical roots – they are not a matter of simple rhetori-
cal excess, the autocratic inclinations of particular politicians, or difficult but 
temporary economic circumstances. In Hungary the divide between “urbanist” 
and “national-populist” traditions has been dated back to the interwar period or 
even earlier (Palonen 2009, 322). In Poland devotion to conservative Catholi-
cism reinforces the rural, southeast Poland basis of PiS support, as opposed to 
PO’s more secular and urban electorate, concentrated in western Poland, War-
saw and Łódź (Fils 2011). Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce” eliminated the 
source of the two successor countries’ most serious cultural division. Ger-
many’s East-West divide, dating primarily from its Cold War political division 
and reinforced by the economic and cultural strains that accompanied state 
unification, helps account for Die Linke’s strength in the eastern states, but it 
has proven less damaging on the elite level. In all the countries considered, the 
gap between the “winners” and “losers” of the transition from Communism 
plays a role in electoral politics, especially in explaining the strength of far-
rightist groups and to an extent that of the post-communists. 
It seems fair to conclude that no definitive “elite settlement” has yet taken 
place in Hungary, and that the Polish Roundtable produced at best only a par-
tial one which is still not shared by a significant section of the elite. Higley and 
Burton’s caution with respect to possible elite “convergence” in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia still seems warranted. Their conviction, however, that 
Germany’s elite consensus persists also seems justified, in spite of the contro-
versial status and disputed legitimacy of Die Linke. The larger lesson is that, 
given the inherent ambiguity of the concept of “elite consensus,” observers 
would be well-advised to be cautious about assigning it too quickly after a 
major political, social, or economic upheaval. Whether and when elite settle-
ments and convergences have been definitively established are questions per-
haps best addressed with the help of considerable historical perspective. 
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